Chapter 8

THE ISSUES

On October 15, 1995, Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), was mugged outside her home in Baltimore. Robert Eugene Perlie, charged with the crime, was on probation for possession of cocaine and resisting arrest. He also had been convicted in the past for other drug offenses, as well as for theft and insurance fraud. Moreover, at the time of the inceident, Perlie was scheduled for four separate trials on charges of illegal transportion of a handgun, violation of probation, drug possession, and malicious destruction and theft.1

The Mikulski mugging represents in microcosm both the problem and the politics of crime in America: A relatively small, hard-core group of repeat offenders commit most crimes, especially violent crimes. Federal lawmakers talk about "getting tough on crime" and then pass laws that affect only the tiny minority of hard-core criminals that come under federal jurisdiction, leaving the vast majority unaffected. Press releases tout federal efforts, even though career criminals remain on the streets. The public becomes more cynical and more alarmed.

Conservative candidates should explain the short-term solution to America's crime problem: putting repeat offenders behind bars and keeping them there. This is not the whole solution, but it is the essential first step in ridding America of the menace of violent crime. And the evidence shows that it works. This means, however, that federal lawmakers must stop posturing for the cameras and recognize that, because most violent street crime is under the jurisdiction of state and local governments, most of the changes in policy need to be made at the state and local levels. The President and Congress should review all current federal laws, determine which impinge upon or undermine the authority of state and local law enforcement, and repeal them.2 The President and Congress can and should provide leadership and policy assistance, but the real solution to the problem of street crime lies at the state and local levels.

In the long term, lawmakers at all levels must recognize that the real reason for America's decades-long crime wave is not poverty, as some have believed. Nor is it race, as others have intimated. It is family breakdown. Nothing could be clearer from the social research than that fatherless children from whatever socioeconomic or racial background are the most likely to commit violent crimes as teenagers and adults. The rising rate of illegitimacy means that teenage crime also will continue to rise. This point must be driven home, repeatedly, and long-range economic and social policies that encourage the formation of stable, two-parent families must be developed. At the same time, Americans must face the fact that some existing government policies encourage illegitimacy and family breakup. To curb crime, these anti-family policies must be ended.

THE FACTS

Public awareness and state and local efforts already are affecting the crime rate, which is dropping in many states and localities. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting figures, there was a 1 percent decrease in "serious crime," a measure of violent crime and property crime, reported by law enforcement agencies for the first six months of 1995.3 It is important to realize that the recent decline is a reduction from a huge statistical base, and that much violent crime is not even reported to law enforcement agencies. That is why America's crime rates are still unacceptably high. For example, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a crime occurs every 2 seconds:4

One violent crime every 17 seconds;

One property crime every 3 seconds;

One murder every 23 minutes;

One forcible rape every 5 minutes;

One robbery every 51 seconds;

One aggravated assault every 28 seconds;

One burglary every 12 seconds;

One larceny-theft every 4 seconds; and

One motor vehicle theft every 20 seconds.

While crime rates have declined somewhat this past year, they are still very high compared with 1960. In 1960, there were 160 violent crimes for every 100,000 Americans; by 1994, there were 715 for every 100,000 Americans, down slightly from 1993. Overall, there were 23,310 murders, 102,100 rapes, 618,820 robberies, and 1,119,950 aggravated assaults in 1994. Since 1990, violent and property crime have declined by 2.2 percent and 8.5 percent respectively, per 100,000 inhabitants.

While still devastating in its impact on American society, the recent downturn is both welcome and, according to John DiIulio, Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, "can be explained in part by policy-driven law enforcement efforts that capitalize on community crime-fighting initiatives and take the bad guys off the streets."5

Conservatives therefore should welcome the debate over crime. Liberals, on the other hand, continue to look to social programs to reduce crime even though these programs have proved ineffective. The fact is that recent success in reducing crime is largely attributable to conservative policies which emphasize tougher and more effective law enforcement and incarceration of violent criminals. Crime is still a politically powerful issue throughout the nation, and in few areas are the political lines clearer. The American people have had enough; they are demanding tough, sweeping changes that will slash the crime rate.

The effectiveness of good police work and extended incarceration of hardened criminals is beyond dispute. Crime rates would drop even more dramatically if more state and local officials initiated tougher and more effective law enforcement on America's streets, as Professor DiIulio suggests, and made violent criminals serve longer prison terms. Examples:

Jacksonville, Florida. State Attorney Harry L. Shorenstein beefed up his prosecutorial team in 1992, got tough with dangerous juvenile offenders, and started to prosecute them as adults and send them to prison. The result: By 1994, Shorenstein's program had sent hundreds of juveniles to jail. With fewer young criminals on the streets, arrests of juveniles declined 30 percent, and the number of juveniles arrested for weapons offenses fell by 41 percent.6

Houston, Texas. Police Chief Sam Nuchia started a "citizens patrol program" to beef up the city's increased police presence. The result: Thousands of citizen patrollers have reported criminal activities to the police, arrests have increased, and police response to emergencies has improved, increasing the productivity of the police and the safety of Houston's citizens.7

Oxnard, California. By using sophisticated crime analysis and an advanced gang-tracking computer data base, and by using a telemarketing computer system to issue crime alerts to residents in high-crime areas, police have helped to reduce violent crime by 38 percent, including a 60 percent drop in the murder rate. Oxnard has reduced crime to its lowest level since the 1960s.8

New York City, New York. Taking over the police department in January 1994, Commissioner William J. Bratton declared a real war on crime, promising in Churchillian fashion to "fight for every house in the city; we will fight for every street; we will fight for every block. And we will win."9 Bratton took command of the city's demoralized 38,000-member police force, held the 76 precinct police commanders directly accountable for their perfor mance in decreasing the crime rate in their precincts, computerized the precinct data system to track the crime problem daily, and dismissed high-level police officials who failed to get in tune with his tough new program.10 In 1994, while major felonies nationwide fell by 2 percent, in New York City they fell by 12 percent. In the first nine months of 1995, they fell another 18 percent.11 Over the past two years, declines in most major felonies, including an almost 40 percent drop in murder, have been dramatic.

But first-rate police work should be combined with a serious sentencing policy for violent criminals. According to Professor DiIulio, "Not surprisingly, therefore, studies show that from 1980 to 1992 the 10 states where incarceration increased the most saw violent crime decrease by 8 percent. In the 10 states with the lowest increases, violent crime soared 51 percent."12 If more state and local officials pursued such policies, more of America's streets and homes would be much safer places.

Conservative candidates should encourage such efforts at every opportunity, and not just because it will do well at the polls. While recent reductions in crime rates are encouraging, the statistical base of violence upon which those rates are calculated from year to year is huge. The tidal wave of crime, which began in the 1960s, continues to roll across America. During the 1960s alone, crime rates more than doubled (see Tables 1 and 2).

America's violent crime rate soared 47 percent from 1975 to 1994, rising from 487.8 to 716.0 per 100,000 inhabitants.13(see Chart 1)

According to the Council on Crime in America, a bipartisan commission chaired by former U.S. Attorney General Griffin Bell and Heritage Foundation Distinguished Fellow William J. Bennett, over 400,000 Americans have been murdered since 1977 almost seven times the number of Americans killed in the Vietnam War.14

The FBI's crime index rate, which includes the violent crimes of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson, rose 1.4 percent (5,298 per 100,000 inhabitants to 5,374 per 100,000 inhabitants) from 1975 to 1994.15

From 1985 to 1994, violent crimes rose 28.6 percent; property crime, 0.2 percent; murder, 13.9 percent; rape, 5.7 percent; robbery, 14.0 percent; and aggravated assault, 42.0 percent. However, as state and local communities continued their efforts to combat crime through tougher truth-in-sentencing laws in 1993 and 1994, the overall crime rate decreased. The FBI crime index fell 2.0 percent. Violent crime was down 4.1 percent; property crimes, 1.7 percent; murder, 5.3 percent; rape, 4.6 percent; robbery, 7.1 percent; and aggravated assault, 2.3 percent.

Juvenile Crime

Most ominously, if the present disintegration of family and social life continues, Americans will see an unprecedented acceleration of the already horrendous levels of juvenile criminal violence. Current data trends clearly indicate that:

Violent crime among juveniles has soared by about 300 percent since 1965. From 1981 to 1990, juvenile arrests for murder increased by 60 percent, while adult arrests increased by just 5.2 percent. In 1990, juveniles committed more than a third of all murders in the country.16

The sharp rise in juvenile crime presents a formidable challenge for future law enforcement. (see Chart 2). There has been a staggering increase in juvenile arrest rates (see Table 3), as well as in the number of arrests for such heinous crimes as murder (see Table 4). From 1985 to 1993, the number of juveniles aged 13 and 14 arrested for murder increased 162 percent. The murder arrest rate increased 207 percent for 15-year-olds, 197 percent for 16-year-olds, 146 percent for 17-year-olds and 119 percent for juveniles aged 18 to 20.17 The numbers of juveniles involved in aggravated assaults, rapes, and robberies also are rising dramatically. If trends continue, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arrest rates for violent juvenile crime will double by the year 2010.

Relationship Between Crime and Family Breakdown

The insufficiency or absence of government social programs does not fuel violent crime. The social science literature is conclusive on one all-important point: The real root cause of violent crime is the breakdown of family and community, especially in America's inner cities.

The professional literature shows that the failure of fathers and mothers to care for the children they bring into the world is at the heart of violent crime. Absent fathers, absent mothers, parental fighting and domestic violence, lack of parental supervision and discipline of children, patterns of parental abuse, neglect or rejection of the child, and criminality among the parents themselves all are conditions that contribute to the creation of a violent crimi nal, and all are most present in the social atmosphere created by broken families and illegitimacy.18

Race and Crime

While serious crime is highest in socially disorganized, largely urban neighborhoods, however, its frequency is not a function of race. The determining factor is the absence of marriage. Among broken families, with their chaotic, "dysfunctional" relationships, whether white or black, the crime rate is very high; among married, two-parent families, whether white or black, the crime rate is very low. The capacity and determination to maintain stable married relationships, not race, is the pivotal factor.19 The chaotic, broken community stems from these chaotic, broken families. The reason race appears to be an important factor in crime is the prevalence of wide differences in marriage rates among ethnic groups. A report from the state of Wisconsin further illustrates this.

Between 1980 and 1993, according to the latest available data, the number of black inmates rose from 46.5 percent to 50.8 percent of the total prison population, from 140,600 to 445,400. Justice Department findings show that, at the end of 1993, blacks were seven times more likely than whites to have been incarcerated in a state or federal prison. An estimated 1,471 blacks per 100,000 black residents and 207 whites per 100,000 white residents were incarcerated in the nation's prisons on December 31, 1993.20

The fact that crime rates are much higher for blacks than whites has tempted some to cite race as a factor in overall crime. It is therefore important for candidates to explain that the evidence does not support this view. When social scientists control for fam ily structure, the rates for blacks and whites are not significantly different. Broken families are most closely correlated with violent crime, regardless of race. In other words, family structure, not race, is the leading indicator of criminal behavior. There is a higher rate of crime among blacks only because black communities have higher rates of illegitimacy and family breakup.

Public Enemy No. 1: The Repeat Offender

Study after study shows that habitual offenders, who amount to a tiny fraction of the total population, commit most violent crimes.

- A February 1992 follow-up for the 1983 special report on recidivism, the nation's largest survey of felons on probation showed that of the 79,000 felons released from prison in 32 counties across 17 states21 in 1986, an estimated 43 percent percent, while out on probation, were re-arrested for a felony or misdemeanor within three years. Half of these arrests were for violent crimes or drug offenses. Within three years of their release, 54 percent had one or more arrests, 24 percent had two or more, and the remaining 22 percent had 3 or more. Also within three years of release, 46 percent of all probationers had been sent back to prison or jail. The study showed that of the 79,043 former prisoners on probation, 43 percent (34,000), were re-arrested and charged with a felony 64,000 times during the three-year follow-up period.22

- A 1982 study by the RAND Corporation found that the average former state inmate committed between 187 and 287 crimes per year, excluding drug deals. Moreover, about 25 percent of former inmates committed more than 135 crimes per year, and about 10 percent committed more than 600 per year.23

- Another RAND study found that 76 percent of former prison inmates in California were re-arrested within three years of release and that 60 percent were convicted of new crimes. In Texas, 60 percent of former inmates were re-arrested within three years of release, and 40 percent were re-convicted within this time.24

- A 1992 study by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms found that the average criminal serving time for firearms offenses commits 160 crimes per year before being incarcerated.25

- According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, more than 80 percent of state inmates in 1986 had at least one previous conviction and criminal sentence, more than 60 percent had two, and almost half had three.26

The Danger of Pretrial Release

Too many hard-core repeat offenders commit crimes while out on bail pending trial on previous criminal charges.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that one in six felony defendants in 1988 was re-arrested on new felony charges while out on bail pending trial. Some 30 percent of felony defendants with five or more prior convictions and out on bail pending trial were re-arrested during 1988; incredibly, two-thirds of these re-arrested defendants were released again pending trial on the new charges.27

A study of pretrial release in 75 of the nation's most populous counties found that 18 percent of felony defendants in 1988 were re-arrested for new felonies while out on bail pending trial. Again, two-thirds were released on bail while awaiting trial on these new charges.28

The kind of outrage that can result from lax pretrial policies is exemplified by the case of Hernando Williams, an Illinois criminal defendant released pending trial on charges of aggravated kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery. While awaiting trial, he kidnapped and raped another woman and locked her in the trunk of his car for several days. He showed up for his court appearance with the woman still locked in the trunk of his car. After that appearance, he committed further sexual assaults on this second victim and then shot and killed her.29

In another notorious case, James Jordan, father of basketball star Michael Jordan, was killed in North Carolina in July 1993. One of the killers who confessed, Larry Martin Demery, was on release pending trial for an armed robbery in which he and another defendant had fractured the skull of a convenience store clerk while attacking her with a cinder block.30

How Criminals Have Been Kept out of Jail

During the 1960s, crime policies based on liberal theories of social injustice sent fewer criminals to prison for shorter terms. The number of offenders imprisoned for every 1,000 violent crime arrests plummeted by almost 50 percent, from 299 in 1960 to 170 in 1970.31 Tougher law-enforcement policies began to return in the 1970s, and the crime rate slowed as the rate of incarceration increased 38 percent. In the conservative 1980s, far tougher policies were adopted.

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, on December 31, 1994, the number of sentenced prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents was 387 up from 139 in 1980. The rate of incarceration more than doubled from 1980 to 1990, increasing by 219 percent. In 1980, there were 329,821 federal and state prisoners; by 1990, there were 773,919. By 1994, the total number of people incarcerated in federal and state penitentiaries since 1980 had increased 219 percent to 1,053,738 (see Chart 6).32

Conservative candidates should note the correlation: With more violent repeat offenders locked up in prison, and therefore unable to commit crimes against the public, the result has been the reduction in serious crime rates noted earlier.

The Failure and Abuse of Probation and Parole

Liberals in Congress and elsewhere often bemoan the fact that there are more than 5 million persons in the United States under "correctional supervision." While it is true that the U.S. prison population is at an all-time high, however, most of those incarcerated are violent criminals or repeat offenders. Moreover, while approximately 1 million persons are imprisoned, an overwhelming majority of convicts another 3.5 million, or 72 percent are not in prison, but on probation or parole,33 and the disparity between the rate of imprisonment and the rate of release on probation or parole has been growing in recent years. Between 1980 and 1994, while the prison population increased by 184 percent, the parole and probation population increased by 204 percent.34

A large proportion of America's crime problem derives from the fact that so many criminals, including violent and repeat offenders, are out on the streets. According to Professor DiIulio, nearly one-third of parolees imprisoned for violent crimes, and nearly one-fifth of those imprisoned for a crime against property, are re-arrested within three years of their release for committing a violent crime. Among convicted felons on probation alone, 54 percent are arrested once, 24 percent are arrested twice, and 22 percent are arrested three or more times. 35

Data from the bipartisan Council on Crime in America show that "On any given day, seven offenders are on the street for every three who are behind bars. During 1994 about 4.2 million cases were handled on probation and 1.1 million were processed on parole. On any given day, there are about 1.5 times more convicted violent offenders out on the streets on probation or parole than behind bars." 36

Members of Congress and federal and state policymakers should encourage innovative leaders at the state and local levels, like Governor George Allen of Virginia, who are stopping the abuse of probation and parole and eliminating these options for violent offenders. 37

One major flaw in current criminal justice policies is the degree to which convicted criminals are sentenced to probation with no prison time at all, or to jail terms of one year or less.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that, in 1990, state courts (where 95 percent of crimes are prosecuted) sentenced 29 percent of all criminal offenders to probation without incarceration. Another 25 percent were sentenced to jail terms of one year or less. Thus, over half (54 percent) of criminals convicted in state courts received either no incarceration or sentences of less than one year in jail.

For violent offenses, 20 percent of convicted criminals received probation with no incarceration, while 21 percent received jail terms of less than one year, leaving 41 percent of all convicted violent offenders in these two categories. Even for the crime of murder, 5 percent of convicted criminals somehow received only probation, and 4 percent received one year or less in jail.38 For the crime of rape, 14 percent received probation, and 19 percent were imprisoned for one year or less, leaving one-third of convicted rapists with little or no serious incarceration (see Table 5).

While on probation, hard-core repeat offenders continue to commit crimes. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 43 percent of those on probation between 1986 and 1989 were arrested at least once on felony charges within three years of being placed on probation. During that same period, 46 percent had been committed to prison or jail or had disappeared, skipping out on their probation.39 Of those receiving probation for murder, 5 percent were re-arrested for murder, and 16 percent were re-arrested for some felony within three years.40

According to another Bureau of Justice Statistics survey, 35 percent of state prison inmates in 1991 were convicted of a new offense committed while they were on probation or parole. Probation and parole violators comprised 30 percent of all offenders in state prisons for a violent crime, 56 percent of inmates incarcerated for property offenses, 41 percent of those convicted of drug offenses, and 85 percent of those in prison for public-order offenses. Collectively, probation and parole violators committed 90,639 violent crimes while being supervised within the community (based on reported convictions).

More than 25 percent of probation and parole violators were in prison for a violent crime. Fifty-five percent of probationers and parolees reported that, in the month before their current offense, they were using drugs. An estimated 41 percent were using drugs daily. Of probation and parolee violators imprisoned for a new offense, 21 percent reported using a firearm while under supervision. Of those possessing a firearm in the month prior to arrest, almost 75 percent were armed when they committed their current offense. Between 1975 and 1991, the number of parolee and release violators entering state prisons increased from 18,000 to 142,000 twice the rate of growth among offenders newly committed from the courts.41

How Light Prison Sentences and Parole Lead to Crime

Another problem is that criminals generally serve only a fraction of their sentences, even as sentences themselves are often too short.

Because of parole and early release programs, sentences handed down by state courts do not indicate time actually served. Table 5 shows the estimated average time that will be served under sentences imposed in state courts in 1990, given past trends.

Data collected from the states by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that for violent crimes, the average time served is three years and seven months (43 months) or 48 percent of the original sentence (89 months). For murder, the average is only five years and 11 months (71 months) or 48 percent of the original sentence (149 months); for robbery, three years and eight months (44 months) or 46 percent of the original sentence (95 months); and for rape, five years and five months (65 months) or 56 percent of the original sentence (117 months).42

These short prison terms for violent repeat offenders do more than trigger a sense of injustice among victims. They also mean more crime.

In 1985, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that approximately 28 percent of all male convicts, and 46 percent of recidivist convicts, still would have been in prison for their first crimes at the time of their admission to prison for a second crime if, instead of being paroled, they had been given sentences in the maximum range for their original convictions. These percentages would be substantially higher for those who committed another crime within their original sentence than they would be for those apprehended, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned during that time.43

In another study released in 1987, the BJS estimated that 69 percent of parolees 17 to 22 years old were re-arrested within six years of their release and that about 29 percent of new arrest charges occurred before these parolees' original sentences would have ended.44

According to the bipartisan Council on Crime in America, "In 1991, 45 percent of state prisoners were persons, who, at the very time they committed their latest crimes, were on probabtion or parole. While free in the community, they committed at least 218,000 violent crimes, including 13,200 murders and11,600 rapes (over half of the rapes against children)."45

Federal Courts Still Gutting Truth in Sentencing Laws

Recognizing the tendency of early-release prisoners to commit crimes, more and more states are adopting "truth in sentencing" laws to keep criminals incarcerated for as much of the full sentence as possible. Under the most common formulation, a criminal convicted of a violent crime is required to serve at least 85 percent of the full sentence. This is perhaps the most effective judicial remedy for violent crime devised so far, because it eliminates probation and parole for violent criminals.

Unfortunately, liberal jurists, apparently more concerned with protecting the rights of prisoners than with protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens victimized by violent crime, are trying to gut these laws. This is particularly true of federal judges who, to relieve prison overcrowding, often order that even violent criminals be released back to the streets. Few states and localities can avoid this federal intervention: Some 39 states and 300 of the nation's largest jails operate under some form of federal court direction.46 The 1994 crime bill inadequately addressed the issue, and the problem remains.

Ostensibly to eliminate "overcrowding," tens of thousands of prisoners have been released onto the streets. But "overcrowding" has never been defined, so each judge is free to determine it on a subjective basis. Far from the popular image of groups of prisoners crammed into single cells, it has come to mean, as arbitrarily defined by several judges, simply more than one prisoner to a cell. Some federal judges even refuse to allow convicted felons to be sent to prison, citing "overcrowding," and just release them even violent criminals and repeat offenders. These released felons have been responsible for tens of thousands of additional violent crimes. For example:

- In Florida, 20,350 criminals were released early in 1993 to comply with a statewide population cap imposed by a federal court.

- In Cook County, Illinois, approximately 30,000 prisoners released each year from pre-trial detention under a prison population cap commit an additional 7,500 violent crimes annually.47

- In Texas, a federal judge, in 1981, imposed a cap on the prison population that forced the state parole board to increase early prisoner releases by over 400 percent. By 1986, there were more convicted violent felons on parole than behind bars.48

- In Georgia, between 1983 and 1993, the state parole board, operating under overcrowding restrictions imposed by the federal court, granted early release to 36,000 violent felons and sex offenders (including 2,772 multiple sex offenders) who had served an average of 36 percent of their sentences.

Only Congress can restrain the excesses of a lenient federal judiciary. It should do so as soon as possible.

The Decline of Police Effectiveness

As Heritage Foundation Distinguished Fellow William Bennett has argued, in the field of public policy there is no more important personnel decision than the hiring of a police officer.49

The dramatic performance of the New York City Police Department in combating violent crime and the innovative community policing methods employed in Houston, Texas, provide ample models for effective police management. Unfortunately, however, a few men and women who should represent the best in their communities sometimes turn out to be the worst, as revealed in press accounts from around the nation detailing alleged police brutality, corruption, and incompetence.

If the recruiting and staffing of state and local police forces is done to select the best in terms of professional competence, personal courage, and moral character, the value to society is beyond calculation. When Americans are threatened by violent criminals, they want the very bravest and the very best to rescue them and their loved ones. They want police officers capable of excellent judgment, as well as physical courage, who can make split-second, life-and-death decisions without violating the parameters set forth by the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, they want police officers and detectives who are shrewd, intellectually capable of cracking the most difficult cases, and able to work with the prosecution team to advance the best case against criminal defendants in court.

The most egregious failures in police effectiveness invariably have been failures of personnel management: the deliberate imposition of lower intellectual and physical standards in recruitment and hiring, reduced background screening, the substitution of "politically correct" racial or ethnic or gender "diversity" for strict standards of competence or merit, poor supervision of officers in the field, and a lack of attention to moral character in the selection of police. For example:

* Miami, Florida. By 1988, more than a third of 200 policemen hired under a special recruiting plan in 1980 had to be fired. This infamous class, hired with a stipulation that 80 percent had to be minority residents, generated a disproportionate amount of police wrongdoing. A shocking 10 percent pleaded guilty to murder and drug trafficking charges. Many of these recruits were "utterly unsuited" to police work, and poor training, "inadequate supervision," and ineffective internal controls enabled them to behave with a "contempt for the law."50

* Washington, D.C. Standards for recruiting and hiring police in the nation's capital have been notoriously lax. In 1982, 40 percent of applicants failed the admissions test. Then the tests were "dumbed down," as were the intellectual and physical standards for graduation from the police academy. In 1987 and 1988, the graduation rate was close to 100 percent. Facing a horrendous wave of violent crime, the city in 1989 and 1990 resorted to rapid hiring, with weak or even non-existent background checks. The results should not have been surprising: In the first ten months of 1992, 32 police officers were indicted on criminal charges which included murder, theft, assault with a deadly weapon, sodomy, and kidnapping, and another 20 were under investigation by the U.S. Attorney's Office for similar crimes.51

* Baltimore, Maryland. Hiring is only part of the problem. Retention is another. In Baltimore, the retention of experienced detectives with well-developed professional skills and an invaluable institutional memory is becoming an issue. The loss of experienced detectives in the city's well-regarded homicide unit is reflected in mistakes in criminal investigations. Privately, prosecutors com plain about the personnel management problem, wary that a lack of experience can compromise the quality of the prosecution's presentation, particularly in tough cases. According to U.S. Attorney Katherine J. Armentout, "In court, it is a loss of an experienced detective who can explain to a jury how you go through an investigation. They have credibility with a jury that is just invaluable."52

* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Philadelphia Police Department has been ripped by devastating scandals. In a widening investigation of police corruption, federal prosecutors have subpoenaed the records of more than 100,000 arrests, and 42 drug convictions have been overturned because of falsified police reports, illegal tactics, and even perjury by police officers.53 The recent problems in Philadelphia have been recurrent: In 1988, several narcotics officers were indicted for racketeering, drug dealing, and perjury.

* New Orleans, Louisiana. Since 1993, more than 50 police officers have been arrested, indicted, or convicted on criminal charges, including aggravated assault and battery, drug trafficking, murder, and rape.54

Americans need, want, and expect the best in their police officers. While no state or local jurisdiction should impose racial or gender quotas on the hiring of police, state and local officials should realize that the best are found in every sector of the community, among every race and ethnic group. There is nothing worse than a bad cop and nothing better than a good one. Good police officers are those with outstanding character, firmly anchored in the community they are duty-bound to protect.

The Huge Cost of Crime

Crime imposes high costs on individuals and families. Victims suffer direct economic damage in loss of funds and property. They also experience pain, suffering, cruelty, temporary or permanent physical impairments and even loss of life. Potential victims suffer fear, inconvenience, and loss of freedom and pay an economic cost for extra locks, bars, guns, and other equipment in trying to avoid crime.

Crime also imposes huge costs on neighborhoods and communities. Neighborhood businesses lose sales when customers fear crime while shopping. Neighborhood workers lose jobs when businesses and investors are scared away by fear of crime. Children lose the opportunity to learn when their schools are dominated by gangs and drug dealers who make it impossible to maintain a learning environment. Governments lose tax revenue when sales, businesses, jobs, and property values decline in crime-ridden areas.

Several studies have attempted to quantify these costs:

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, crime victims in 1992 lost $17.6 billion in direct costs. These direct costs include items such as losses from cash, property theft or damage, direct medical costs, or lost income from loss of time at work. It does not include indirect costs, including the costs of long-term health problems, higher insurance premiums resulting from changed health status, or the pain and suffering, the non-economic damage, that afflicts victims of violent crime, which would make the economic costs of crime signifcantly higher.

Average Loss per Crime, 199255

Note: Data include all forms of economic loss, medical expenses, and time lost from work because of crime.Includes crimes involving no loss.

"Among crimes that involved loss:"

- About 12 percent of personal crimes and 24 percent of household crimes involved economic losses of $500 or more.

- For personal crimes, 11 percent of whites and 15 percent of blacks lost $500 or more. For household crimes, 23 percent of whites and 25 percent of blacks had such losses.

- In robberies, at least $250 or more was taken from the victim in about a fourth (26 percent) of all victimizations. Blacks lost this amount in 41 percent of the victimizations, and whites, in 19 percent

- Lost property was not recovered in 89 percent of personal crimes (90 percent for whites; 89 percent for blacks) and 85 percent of household crimes (85 percent for whites; 82 percent for blacks) in 1992.56

- Also in 1992, among robbery victims who suffered economic loss, blacks were more likely than whites to lose $250 or more: about 4 in 10 for blacks compared to 2 in 10 for whites.57

Total Economic Loss to Victims of Crime, 199258

- Recent losses fit previous patterns. A 1982 RAND Corporation study estimated that crimes committed by the average released inmate cost society about $430,000 for each criminal per year.59

- A 1990 study attempted to include as many indirect costs of crime as reasonably could be quantified. The authors estimated that the average inmate costs society between $172,000 and $2,364,000 per year while outside prison, and these costs did not include any calculation of the harm associated with homicide, rape, or drug crimes.60

- The Department of Justice reports that in 1993, more black Ameri cans were murdered than whites, even though blacks constitute only 12.6 percent of the American population.61 The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in 1988 that the lifetime risk of being a homicide victim was 1 in 179 for white men but 1 in 30 for black men and 1 in 495 for white women but 1 in 132 for black women.62

- According to the Department of Justice, for blacks of all ages, homicide was the fourth leading cause of death, but for black males and females age 15-24, it was the leading cause of death.63 In 1991, most homicide victims were males, between the ages of 15 and 44. Black males had the highest homicide rate (72 per 100,000), followed by black females (14 per 100,000), white males (9 per 100,000), and white females (3 per 100,000). Overall, for all ages, black males age 15-24 had the highest homicide rate (159 per 100,000).64

- In 1992, the violent crime rate was 50.4 per 1,000 for black victims, over 68 percent higher than the 29.9 per 1,000 for white victims. The robbery rate for black victims was more than double the rate for white victims.65

One consequence of the disproportionate incidence of crime against black Americans is that black and other minority neighborhoods face greater losses in economic opportunity and growth as small entrepreneurs are crippled and jobs are destroyed. With their schools so often undermined by crime, black and other minority children are often denied the basic educational opportunities enjoyed by white children in equivalent neighborhoods. Crime and its associated costs constitute a high extra tax on businesses and households in low-income minority communities. As discussed in Chapter 6, poverty is not the root cause of crime in these neighborhoods; crime is a root cause of poverty. Until crime is drastically reduced in America's inner cities and low-income and minority communities, social programs or other efforts to revive their economic fortunes cannot succeed.

Based on the level of violent crime, it is clear from Chart 7 66 that high-crime cities were underfunded and low-crime cities were overfunded. Worse, police funding has become yet another extension of the Clinton Administration's politically correct "diversity" agenda, a classic liberal program of social engineering in which local police departments are required to establish racial or gender-based quotas under the guise of crime-fighting in order to get federal funding. Under the Clinton Administration formula, local police departments must submit analyses of "underutilization" of women and minorities in accordance with "community labor statistics" (broken down by race, sex, gender, and job category); outline "affirmative action" plans that include "goals" and specific steps to achieve "goals" for correcting the "underutilization" of women; and transmit quarterly reports, plus a copy, to official Washington on their progress in implementing these federally approved plans. So onerous is compliance (within 30 days) of these bureaucratic requirements unrelated to reducing violent crime that Oklahoma City Chief of Police Sam Gonzales recommended that the city turn down the monies from the Department of Justice:

The Office for Civil Rights [of the Department of Justice] requires a specific plan for the equal employment of women and minorities within the Police Department's sworn personnel. I believe this particular language to be very significant in that it states "equal employment" of women and minorities rather than "equal employment opportunity."67

By December 1995, the Clinton Administration's program has been able to add 26,000 additional police to local forces throughout the country, still far short of the goal of 100,000 cops on the streets. Over 600 localities have turned down the program, largely because they could not afford the 25 percent financial match requirement for participation in the program. Moreover, according to an analysis by the General Accounting Office, 7000 local jurisdictions did not even apply for the Clinton Administration's grant money overwhelmingly because of the cost of participation, but cited other factors as well, including the absence of need, restrictive regulations and excessively "burdensome" paperwork requirements.68

THE 104TH CONGRESS

To fulfill of the "Taking Back Our Streets" provisions of the Contract with America, members of the House of Representatives debated and passed six crime-related bills in 1995. These measures included solid provisions governing truth in sentencing of violent criminals, good faith exemption to the exclusionary rule in the gathering of critical evidence by police, effective death penalty provisions, a reordering of funding from social programs to crime-fighting programs (including prison construction and police funding) and victim restitution.

H.R. 665, the Victim Restitution Act of 1995, passed in February, would require judges in felony cases to order criminals convicted in federal criminal trials to pay full restitution to victims, and to any other person harmed in the commission of the crime, for all damages resulting from the crime. Federal judges would be given the discretion to award restitution in lieu of other punishments, and restitution payments would be a condition of probation or parole.

H.R. 666, the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995, would establish an exception to the exclusionary rule, which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution (which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures) from consideration in federal prosecutions. H.R. 666 would allow such evidence to be considered if the officers who improperly obtained evidence did so in the "objectively reasonable belief" that their actions complied with the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

In 1983, the Justice Department estimated that up to 55,000 serious criminal cases were dropped every year because exclusionary rule restrictions eliminated the evidence needed for prosecution. By 1992, an independent report concluded that the number had grown to 120,000, including 30,000 violent crimes and 90,000 serious property crimes. This figure does not include the tens of thousands of crimes that could have been prevented, or the cases that never came to trial because police are effectively prohibited from gathering evidence and questioning suspects.

Recent federal court decisions already provide for a good-faith exception to this rule, allowing evidence to be admitted when the authorities believed in "good faith" that they were acting in compliance with all requirements.69 This House proposal would further clarify this exception but would not sanction deliberate violations of constitutional requirements. State legislation also should be enacted to provide for recognition of this good-faith exception in every jurisdiction.

H.R. 667, the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995, would modify the Clinton Administration's Violent Crime Control Enforcement Act of 1994 by significantly increasing funding for state prison grants (from $8 billion to $10.3 billion over five years) and adding incentives for states to curtail early parole for violent criminals. Grants would be used for construction of prisons and other correctional facilities and for states that enact truth in sentencing laws requiring serious violent felons to serve at least 85 percent of the sentence imposed.

H.R. 668, the Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act of 1995, would expedite deportation procedures for non-resident aliens convicted of serious felonies, as well as counterfeiting, bribery, trafficking in stolen vehicles, perjury, or the subornation of perjury. The government could begin deportation proceedings as soon as the criminal alien is incarcerated.

H.R. 728, the Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grants Act of 1995, would authorize $10 billion in grants over five years to local governments for law enforcement purposes, including hir ing, training, and equipping police officers; enhancing school security measures; establishing crime prevention programs and drug courts; and enhancing adjudication of cases involving juvenile crime. The bill broadens state and local discretion in the use of police funding.

H.R. 779, the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995, would address the procedures by which federal courts review state and federal convictions and sentences to determine whether judgments are contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Specifically, it would establish a one-year limit for filing a habeas corpus petition in federal court by any person convicted of a state crime. The bill also requires that state prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief must exhaust all state remedies before bringing action in the federal court.

Congressional action on habeas corpus is long overdue. Under an 1867 federal law, state prisoners may file habeas corpus petitions in federal courts for review of their cases. Prisoners abuse this right by filing endless frivolous petitions that raise no valid claims, often delaying application of the death penalty until every conceivable legal loophole has been exhausted. Petitions in many state courts are similarly abused.

What is really needed is for each state to adopt legislation providing for only one habeas petition, to be filed within a year of the last appellate decision, which raises only issues that could not have been raised in previous state proceedings. It also should be specified that changes in the law will not apply retroactively to previously decided cases, as held in 1989 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane.70

The Senate has voted on block granting 1994 crime bill monies to remove excessive federal regulation of state and local law enforcement officials and has enacted an anti-terrorism bill (S. 735), which includes major provisions similar to those in H.R. 729 restricting excessive appeals by death row inmates in federal courts, who often clog the system with endless and frivolous appeals. The Senate Judiciary Committee also has approved the House-passed victim restitution bill (H.R. 665).

WHAT TO DO IN 1997

Congress should:

- Restrict the ability of the federal judiciary to impose prison caps. Under Section 3626 of the 1994 federal crime bill, Congress attempted to bar federal judges from imposing prison caps restrictions on the number of prisoners that can be incarcerated at a particular prison which result in many violent criminals being released long before their terms have been served. With the legal assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), liberal lawyers and federal judges quickly found ways to evade this provision.

Therefore, the first major initiative of the new Congress should be to define clearly the scope of federal judicial authority over state and local prisons and "abide by federal laws governing the limited role of the federal courts in conditions of confinement."71 New Members of Congress should reassert their clear and indisputable constitutional authority under Article III, Section 2, and define for the federal courts the "exceptions" and "regulations" that should apply to federal judicial action over state prisons.

- Reduce federal intrusion into state crime-fighting activities and help the states fight crime by letting them keep more of their own money. Congress should affirm the division of authority between the federal government and the states in combating violent crime. Federal officials have enough to do in fighting the illegal narcotics traffic and enforcing federal laws against powerful organized crime syndicates without trying to get involved in fighting street crime. Therefore, Congress should undertake a systematic review of every federal law dealing with violent crime, determine which provisions interfere with or undermine legitimate state and local law enforcement authority, and then repeal them. Congress also should review Department of Justice advocacy before the Supreme Court to determine whether the department is adequately supporting state and local law enforcement officials in criminal cases, and should examine the impact of the Supreme Court's Miranda rules governing confessions to make sure that these restrictions do not unreasonably limit the ability of police officers to question criminal suspects.

In the meantime, if Congress wants to assist state and local law enforcement authorities, it should rebate up to two percent of the federal personal income tax taken from the residents of any state on the condition that the state raise an equivalent amount to combat violent crime within its territory. Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) in 1994 offered a similar proposal under which these rebates would have amounted to $55 billion in constant dollars over a five-year period, a reliable stream of funding for anti-crime initiatives.

- Hold hearings on the real root causes of crime. Given the disconnect between official Washington's thinking, embodied in the social spending in the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1994, and reality, Congress should conduct a series of hearings on the real root causes the long term causes of crime, particularly on the importance of family structure, including marriage and religious practice, in preventing violent crime. The professional literature, the most recent scholarship, and particularly the experience of private organizations involved in crime prevention, all are wide and deep on this point.

- Conduct a serious review of all national social programs. Congress should review all national social programs, particularly those which are supposed to help prevent or reduce crime, with the director of each program required to present both the evaluation data on the program's effectiveness and national trend data on the problem.

- Repeal federal restrictions on prison labor. All federal statutes restricting prison work should be repealed. These include the Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929, which authorizes states to ban commerce in prison-made goods within their borders; the Sumners-Ashurst Act of 1940, which prohibits transportation of prison-made goods within a state for private use; and the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, which prohibits prison work on government contracts exceeding $10,000.72

In 1995, Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL) introduced a bill (S. 930) to accelerate the reform of prison operations. The bill requires inmates in federal prisons, and in the prisons of states receiving federal money under the 1994 crime bill to help them build new facilities, to work 48 hours and study 16 hours per week. The legislation also repeals the social work requirements of the 1994 bill; significantly reduces prisoners' "free time" to enjoy a host of amenities; and requires that the food prisoners receive is not superior in quality or quantity to the food made available to enlisted personnel in the United States Army.

Debate on the relative effectiveness of rehabilitation and punishment has swung back and forth in the penology literature for over a century. The appeal of the Shelby proposal is that it combines rehabilitation, education, work, and punishment in one package. Nor is it really all that stringent; all it requires is that a prisoner's life be similar to that of a hardworking young taxpayer who holds a job and goes to college at night.

The President should:

- Assert political leadership by speaking out on the real causes of crime. The President can promote volunteer community efforts, including the efforts of religious institutions, which prove successful in combatting the social pathologies, particularly broken families, at the root of much violent crime.

Amid the social collapse of so many urban neighborhoods, there are stunning examples of successful efforts to turn around the lives of young people previously immersed in crime. These efforts invariably possess two features: a strong system of rules within an organization that is characterized by the love and firm guidance most often seen in a supportive family and a strong spiritual dimension, most commonly a profound religious commitment to living a good life. Examples abound.

* Leon Watkins of South Central Los Angeles, convinced that gangs fill a void for those who join them, helps the gang fill the void in a way that bridges to society. According to Watkins, being in a gang is like a religious commitment: There are codes of conduct and service to a higher good than oneself. Watkins shows gang members how to be true to all that attracts them to the gang and still be true to themselves and the society around them. As the spiritual inspiration behind his efforts becomes clear to the youth, they also become aware of the spiritual dimension of their own lives.

* The House of Umoja in Philadelphia has been a great help to hundreds of young men returning from prison. It is a place to stay where the rules are straight and the goal is clear: Contribute to society, be committed to someone, work, and stay out of trouble. However, despite the good accomplished, and the good will of these difficult young men towards the House of Umoja and its style of working with them, it has suffered from the "helping hand" of government. Regulations and local government requirements have become such obstacles to its work that it has been unable to thrive and grow as it wanted to and as its clients wanted it to.

* Rev. Lee Earl, now with the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise in Washington, D.C., started a church in one of the most desolate sections of Detroit, a neighborhood whose economy was built on drugs, prostitution, and welfare. Within a decade, under the inspiration of the spiritual leadership of Rev. Earl, the same people had rebuilt their community. They became married families, started small businesses, and rebuilt and bought their own homes. Crime plummeted and a community was reborn.

One thing is common to all these efforts: giving people a place to belong. This involves deep and often long-term personal relationships with "at-risk" teens or children. These relationships do not take money. They do take a generous commitment of personal time, the kind of commitment found in programs like Big Brothers and Big Sisters. Government cannot purchase these efforts. If it tries, it vitiates them by turning moral relationships into monetary ones.

- Heed the recommendations of law enforcement organizations on the fitness of judicial nominees. The American Bar Association has become highly politicized in recent years. Its leaders have resorted to inflammatory political rhetoric in attacking the leadership of Congress, and its liberal ideological bias has long since compromised its integrity as an independent reviewer of the professional qualifications and fitness of candidates for judicial office. The President should dispense with the ABA's advice and seek an alternative source for measuring the professional fitness of judicial candidates. At the very least, he should give equal consideration to the views of constitutional experts selected by law enforcement associations, particularly with regard to the sensitivity of judicial nominees to public safety.

- Order the Justice Department to issue an annual state-by-state report card on key indices of crime prevention and reduction. The key to reducing crime is for state and local officials to identify repeat offenders and keep them in prison for long terms so they cannot continue to prey upon the public. In 1992, former Attorney General William Barr produced a thorough report detailing the changes that need to be made to accomplish this goal.73

Most of these changes need to be made at the state level, where 98 percent of all crimes are prosecuted. The Attorney General could issue an annual report card based on reductions in violent crime and the adoption of specific crime-fighting remedies. Rankings on crime reduction could be based on current FBI and Bureau of Justice Statistics data. Rankings on crime-fighting could be based on a state's adoption of specific remedies. Therefore, the states should:

- Sharply restrict pre-trial release for dangerous defendants. States should enact legislation and, if necessary, amend their constitutions to allow for detention without bail pending trial for defendants who pose a proven threat to victims, witnesses, or the community at large. Legislation to grant judges this power in federal courts was adopted in 1984. Under this law, a judge who finds that release will endanger the safety of any other person or the community, and that no combination of conditions on a release can reasonably assure such safety, may deny bail and order the defendant detained until trial. Any defendant convicted within the past five years of a violent crime committed on pre-trial release is automatically presumed to be a danger to the community. An additional sentence of two to 10 years also applies to any felony committed while on pre-trial release.

This law has worked well at the federal level and provides a model that should be adopted by every state to prevent repeat offenders from committing crimes pending trial, which remains a significant problem.

- Sharply limit probation. Probation should be prohibited for the following serious offenses: murder, rape, armed robbery, felonies involving the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury, or a second conviction for any felony. Probation leaves these classes of criminals free to threaten law-abiding citizens. Limiting it is a commonsense way to keep serious repeat offenders off the streets.

- Adopt strict state sentencing guidelines. A comprehensive and complex set of guidelines developed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission has been adopted to govern sentencing for federal crimes. These guidelines specify a narrow range of sentences for each crime which vary according to the seriousness of the crime, the prior record of the defendant, whether a weapon was used, how much bodily injury or financial loss was caused, and other factors. Federal judges must impose sentences within this narrow range, except in cases where the judge believes special circumstances warrant a departure. The prosecution or defense may appeal a sentence departing from the guidelines, and such departure will not be upheld without a strong and valid justification.

If states adopted such sentencing guidelines, liberal or lenient judges would be hard pressed to evade them. This is one of the most important reforms state officials could adopt to get repeat offenders off the streets.

- Abolish parole for violent offenders. Under federal sentencing guidelines, parole has been all but abolished. Early release is allowed only for "good time credits," which may reduce the imposed sentence by no more than 15 percent. If states adopted this standard, it could be a powerful weapon in the fight to keep violent repeat offenders in prison. Virginia Governor George Allen made this reform a central theme in his criminal justice reform program.

- Acquire adequate prison space. No reform aimed at incarcerating repeat and violent criminals can succeed without sufficient prison space. In most jurisdictions, including the federal system, this means constructing or otherwise acquiring additional capacity. As former Attorney General Barr has said, "The choice is clear: More prison space or more crime."74

Lawmakers can justify this expenditure by noting that the cost of acquiring additional prison space is offset not only by the far larger savings to society from reducing crime, but also by the incalculable benefits derived from protecting the lives and property of American citizens. Costs also can be reduced significantly by contracting out the construction and operation of prisons to private firms which have a proved they can build and operate additional prison space at substantially less cost than government bureaucracies. With private owners and operators, government also need not provide full financing of construction costs up front a severe constraint in most states. Financing could be obtained by the owner in private capital markets and recouped over time through fees paid by the government for use of a facility.

Private firms have proved they can construct and bring into operation new facilities much more quickly than the government, thereby reducing capital costs. Competitive market incentives produce more cost-effective construction, management, and operation design on the part of private firms. Private construction of prisons is much more common than private operation, but there still are dozens of successful prisons operated privately with higher quality and at much lower cost.75

- Require prisoners to work. State legislation should be enacted to require inmates to work full-time while in prison. Any net earnings should go first to the victim as restitution, after which at least half should go to the prison to finance incarceration costs. In addition to generating funds for these purposes, required work would teach discipline, mold positive social attitudes, and develop work skills that enable the prisoner to obtain gainful employment after release. A 1991 federal study found that convicts who worked in prison were less likely to commit crimes after release and much more likely to be gainfully employed.76

Requiring prisoners to work also can reduce operating costs by using at least part of the resulting products and services to offset prison budgets (see below). Texas A&M economics professor Morgan Reynolds points out that in the past, many prisons were self-financing thanks to required work by inmates.77

- Require prisoners to study. Training, education, and counseling sessions should be offered to prisoners in the evenings and on weekends the same time non-criminal working adults outside prison must attend classes. Requiring such extra effort to obtain the benefits of higher achievement would teach better social attitudes and build self-respect.

- End furloughs and other temporary release programs.Violent or repeat offenders should not be released from prison on unsupervised furloughs, work/education release, or other temporary or conditional release programs. Nearly 60 percent of prisoner escapes in 1990 occurred during furlough or work/education releases,78 and many crimes are committed by prisoners during such furloughs or releases.79 Violent or repeat offenders also should not be released pending appeal of a conviction, as this merely allows them the further opportunity to flee and commit additional crimes.

- Impose the death penalty for heinous crimes. The death penalty should be imposed for several particularly serious offenses: murder of law enforcement officers, murder committed during commission of a serious felony, murder committed in prison, or other murders in which the jury finds aggravating factors that outweigh any mitigating factors and result in a crime sufficiently heinous to justify death as the penalty. In fact, the death penalty is used sparingly in the United States. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, of the 4984 prisoners sentenced to death during the period 1973 to 1993, 226, or 4.5 percent, were executed.80

The death penalty deters potential murderers, permanently prevents repeat offenders, and exacts appropriate justice for the most heinous crimes.81

- Guarantee victims' rights. State legislation should be enacted to establish clearly the following rights of victims: the right to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings parallel to the rights of defendants, including bail and other hearings, plea negotiations, sentencing, and any other public proceedings; the right to present a "victim's impact statement" at the time of sentencing, with surviving family members exercising the deceased victim's rights; the right to full restitution out of any assets or earnings of the defendant, including the full rights of collection as enjoyed by any other creditor, with exemption from discharge if the criminal files for bankruptcy; the right to be fully informed of all proceedings against the defendant, as well as the defendant's incarceration; and the right to mandate HIV testing of defendants in sexual offense cases before trial, and periodic tests to catch a latent HIV infection. In addition, every prosecutor's office should have a victim-witness coordinator to inform victims of their rights and help them exercise those rights.

Each state also should establish in its criminal statutes a clear right of self-defense that allows the victim of a crime to use deadly force to protect himself from bodily harm and to protect his home or business. The same right of self-defense "without retreat" should apply elsewhere when the victim is not at fault in causing an altercation. Innocent victims should not be subject to legal second-guessing of the snap and usually frightened judgments they make under extreme distress in exercising their right to self-defense, though use of excessive force must remain illegal. The law also should exempt from civil liability any action committed in self-defense that is not a violation of criminal law, as well as any other injury suffered by a criminal while committing a crime.82

- Reform the juvenile justice system. While overall crime rates have declined, the major criminal threat to civil society is the rapid increase in juvenile crime. Yet juvenile criminals generally are exempt from the criminal justice system until they reach age 18; instead, they are often covered by juvenile delinquency systems that impose little if any real punishment, typically granting probation for crime after crime or holding offenders for relatively short periods in ineffective juvenile detention centers. Gaining control of the crime problem therefore requires thorough reform of the juvenile justice system.

First, states should enact legislation that allows adult charges for juveniles 14 or older who commit murder, rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, or assault with a firearm, or who intentionally inflict serious physical injury.

Second, all offenders who remain in juvenile delinquency systems should be required to pay restitution to their victims. For every serious offense, the juvenile also should be sentenced to extended, mandatory participation in a highly structured community service or public works program after school and on weekends.

Third, an extended sentence to an institutional boot camp should be required for repeat offenders, juvenile offenders who fail to comply with sentenced participation in community service or public works programs, and juveniles under the age of 14 who commit violent crimes. Such boot camps should be operated with military-style regimentation and discipline, providing education and requiring work on a highly structured schedule. Young offenders generally come from single-parent families, with many of their neighbors and even parents involved in drugs, alcohol abuse, prostitution, or other crimes. Their moral development can be achieved only by removing them from this environment and keeping them in one that requires moral responsibility for several years. Sentences to such boot camps until adulthood at 18 should be common for those whose crimes qualify them for such sentences.

Fourth, records of juvenile convictions for crimes of violence should be carefully maintained and made available at sentencing for any future crimes of violence committed in juvenile years or adulthood. Studies show that juvenile crime records are one of the strongest predictors of repeat adult crime. Considering these ear lier convictions will lead to stronger sentences for repeat offenders at an earlier age, thereby further reducing crime.83

- Clean up the police departments and make greater use of community policing. Most police officers are solid members of their communities, but the failure of the criminal justice system to incarcerate repeat and violent offenders demoralizes even the best of them. Beyond this political failure, too many cities have made matters worse by deliberately lowering service standards and imposing racial and gender quotas on a job that should be filled only on the basis of individual merit.

The absence of effective screening for criminal misconduct, poor starting salaries, poor supervision by commanders in the field, atrocious personnel management, failure to recruit personnel of outstanding character as well as ability all these factors have combined to encourage patterns of brutality, corruption, and demoralization in too many police departments in American cities. Charges and revelations of corruption, brutality, and tampering with evidence in Philadelphia, New Orleans, and Los Angeles have undermined public confidence in the police. There is no substitute for character and moral integrity in a police officer: A bad person cannot be a good cop. From the standpoint of personnel management, recruiting, and hiring, the acquisition of good police officers should be the first order of business. And while officers should be recruited from every sector of the community, only the best should be hired and only on merit.

State and local officials also should return to an older tradition of policing. The police in most communities operate by patrolling in police cars, waiting for calls for help and then responding as quickly as possible. An alternative strategy now developing is known as community policing. Under this approach, officers are assigned to small neighborhoods and are responsible for getting out of their cars and spending most of their time walking the beat. By visiting local businesses, talking to residents, attending community meetings, and learning first-hand what is going on and what the citizens are concerned about, they gain a far more detailed understanding of the people and their neighborhoods. Police-citizen community activities include organizing citizen crime-watch patrols, canvassing local businesses and private security guards to glean information, and instructing all citizens on what they must look for to assist the police and avoid becoming victims of crime.

The community policing strategy has proven quite successful in deterring crime, apprehending criminals, and removing fear from communities.84 State and local governments should use this approach more widely, substantially increasing police personnel and assigning them to high-crime areas where they can provide a strong police presence on the streets.

Q&A

Q. Why are conservatives more interested in sending more young men to prison than in keeping them out?

A. The first task of government is to protect its citizens. That means putting more violent criminals in prison and keeping them there. Rehabilitation programs have not delivered on their promise to reduce violent crime, and citizens should not be asked to put their hopes in rehabilitation for these kinds of criminals. Innocent citizens are not protected by such hopes. This is not to say that long-term prevention strategies should be abandoned. To the contrary, conservatives affirm prevention strategies, including many now operating in the private sector, that work and are solidly grounded in the institutions that can best prevent crime: the family, the church, and the school. In the meantime, a sound conservative social policy would aim to strengthen these institutions. This is the best way to keep young men out of prison. 85

Q. Isn't crime going down?

A. Yes; overall, violent crime is going down slightly. That is the good news. Nevertheless, it is still 350 percent higher than just 30 years ago. Further bad news is that teenage violent crime is going up and shows every sign of continuing to rise for the next 16 years at least unless there is a major cultural change in the United States. This is so because the rise in violent crime is directly related to the breakdown in family and community, and Americans have yet to see an increasing number of out-of-wedlock children grow up without parental supervision, love, or discipline. If Americans somehow could turn the deteriorating family structure around, strengthening the nation's families and recording no more out-of-wedlock births from today onwards, we still would have to wait for this psychologically damaged and potentially violent group of young offenders to work their way through the system.

Q. What is wrong with imposing uniform federal sentences? Shouldn't a crime receive the same penalty in any part of the US.?

A. We have state and local judges and juries to evaluate the cir cumstances and the level of guilt in each case. Judges ought to have descretion to impose different sentences; but, at the same time, criminals should be required to serve at least 85 percent of these sentences. Truth in sentencing is just that: If you do the crime, you do the time. Everybody is clear: the judge, the jailer, the criminal, and last but not least the citizen. But that is a policy decision best left to the states. Local communities can best assess the effectiveness of their local judges.

Q. Why do conservatives in Congress oppose federal assistance to police in the President's crime bill?

A. Conservatives in Congress don't oppose federal assistance to local law enforcement. Under the proposal enacted by the House of Representatives, Congress can continue to do the very best that the Clinton Administration program can do, but can do it even better. With the congressional block grant approach, passed by the House of Representatives and threatened with a veto by President Clinton, local police can get even more money, may be able to hire even more personnel, and they will have even more flexibility to use these funds in a fashion that best suits local needs.

Moreover, the Clinton Administration funding for police is at the discretion of the President. There is solid evidence that Administration funding does not go to localities hit hardest by violent crime. For example, Portland, Oregon, which accounts for 56 percent of all violent crime committed in the state of Oregon, got less than one percent of the funding awarded to Oregon.86

Q. Isn't America's prison population exploding because law enforcement is cracking down on minor drug offenses?

A. No. As the bipartisan Council on Crime in America reports, since 1974, over 90 percent of all inmates in state prisons have been either violent offenders or repeat felons. Between 1980 and 1993, the number of persons imprisoned for violent crimes grew by 221,000, or 1.3 times the growth of those imprisoned as "drug offenders." Furthermore, 80 percent of federal and state drug offenders are drug traffickers with a history of repeat offenses. 87

Cary, Mary Kate, "How States Can Fight Violent Crime: Two Dozen Steps to a Safer America," Backgrounder No. 944/S, June 7, 1993.

Barr, William P., "Crime, Poverty, and the Family," Heritage Lecture No. 401, August 7, 1992.

Warner, James H., "Guns, Crime, and the Culture War," Heritage Lecture No. 393, July 2, 1992.

Greenberg, Reuben, "Less Bang for the Buck: The Market Approach to Crime Control," Policy Review No. 59, January 1, 1992.

Horowitz, Carl F., "An Empowerment Strategy for Eliminating Neighborhood Crime," Backgrounder No. 814, March 5, 1991.

Fagan, Patrick F., "The Real Root Causes of Violent Crime: The Breakdown of Marriage, Family, and Community," Backgrounder No. 1026, March 17, 1995.

EXPERTS

Edwin Meese III
Ronald Reagan Fellow in Public Policy
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
phone: 202-608-6181

Mary Kate Cary
Cary Communications
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Suite 352
Washington, D.C. 20036
phone: 202-223-0484

Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D.
Deputy Director of Domestic Policy Studies
The Heritage Foundation
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phone: 202-608-6210
e-mail: moffitb@heritage.org

John Walters
New Citizenship Project
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phone: 202-822-8333

Patrick Fagan
William H.G. Fitzgerald Senior Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
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phone: 202-608-6207
e-mail: faganp@heritage.org

James Wootton
Safe Streets Alliance
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phone: 202-822-8325